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Abstract
We study the impact of parental transfers to their children in early life on the
child’s support to the parents at older ages either in time or with money. We conjec-
ture that the type of transfer from the parents has an impact on what kind of help
they receive from their children. Using data from the China Health and Retirement
Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) we find that transfers in children’s education are
associated with higher financial help at older ages. In contrast, transfers to support
the children’s marriage are positively linked with time support, such as more visits,
from children to their parents. The children’s residential decisions are identified as
an important mechanism: transfers into education tend to let children move further
away whereas marital transfers are associated with children staying closer to one’s
parents.
JEL Classification: D13, J13, J14
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1 Introduction
Intergenerational family ties are an important element to sustain well-being in old age.
Old-age support from younger family members is especially important in countries with
less developed public social security and formal long-term care systems. Family ties
are often reciprocal: the children’s help is rewarded by parental inter-vivo transfers or
bequests. In addition to contemporary transfers, transfers and investments earlier in
the children’s life might also shape their duty to take care of their parents at old-age.
Yet, the question arises, whether these early-life transfers – such as education, buying
a house, or a marriage – affect their caregiving behavior in the same way, or rather
differently.
In this paper, we analyze intergenerational reciprocity by focusing on early life trans-
fers and particularly highlighting the importance of residential choice. We study the
reciprocal behavior of parental transfers to children earlier in life and the children’s de-
cision to migrate, which in turn influence their possibilities to take care of their parents
when they become old. We use data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudi-
nal Study (CHARLS). We aim to contrast the impact of two different kinds of parental
transfers on children’s behavior: marital transfers and educational transfers. We hy-
pothesize, that both transfers act very differently in the child’s residential decision and,
hence, on the propensity to support their parents. Investments into education poten-
tially incentivize children to move away from the parents to a place with better job
possibilities. These children tend to be financially well-off and support their parents
financially at older ages. On the other hand, if parents provide marital transfers, such
as a house, then children are rather incentivized to stay close to their parents. This, in
turn, would lead to more time that children are able to spend with their parents and
allows for potential caregiving for parents in need of long-term care.
In China, supporting children’s education and marriage gifts are the two most im-
portant early-life transfers to children (Anderson, 2007; Wei & Zhang, 2011). In rural
China, the bride-price amounts to 82 percent of the value of households’ major durable
goods, on average (Brown, 2009). In addition, 15 percent of parents even buy a house
for their marrying children. Investing into the child’s education also entails large direct
and indirect costs. Sizable costs arise for teaching material, uniforms, school-lunch, as
well as tuition fees for higher education, and they pose a hurdle for many poor families
in China (Chi & Qian, 2016; Bray, 1996; Brown & Park, 2002). In addition, sending
one’s children to school might imply high opportunity costs. In many rural families chil-
dren start to work early to contribute to family earnings. Investing into the children’s
education makes it more likely that these children move away from the rural areas into
the cities for better earning potentials. In 2016, 136 million rural migrants are working
in urban areas in China, which amounts to around 10 percent of the total population.1
A strict household registration system (Hukou) discourages migrants from bringing the
whole family as major social benefits cannot be transferred. As a result, old parents are
often left-behind while migrants are able to provide financial help to parents through
1Data sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC)
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remittances.
Old-age support in China still heavily relies on money and time transfers from de-
scendants due to not only economic reasons, but also the belief in Confucian filial piety.2
49% (73%) of urban (rural) elderly parents in China receive either care or money from
their children (Lee & Xiao, 1998). Staying close to one’s parents allows for more help
in time, fulfills the principal of filial piety in China and improves the well-being of the
parents (Chen & Silverstein, 2000).
We first present descriptive statistics on intergenerational family ties in China. Since
less than 10 percent in our sample are a single-child we can focus on the heterogeneity
between siblings. We show that marital transfers are substantial but they are very
unequally distributed within families: in 25 percent of the families, only one child receives
a marital gift whereas all other children receive nothing. Similarly, in more than 60
percent of families, siblings attained different educational degrees. Child support is also
substantial but heterogeneous among siblings. Almost all children visit their parents and
around 75 percent of children provide financial transfers. However, transfer amounts and
visit frequencies differ greatly among siblings.
In our estimations, we make use of the panel dimension of CHARLS at the child-
level. We employ a linear family-time fixed effect model which allows us to control for
unobserved time-varying child characteristics. As our first main result, we find past
marital transfers to the children to be positively associated with time support while
educational transfers encourage monetary support of the parents later in life. Children
who received a house as marital gifts spend 3 more visits per month with their parents, on
average. They have a 3 percentage points (p.p.) higher probability of providing future
help. Further, they provide 25% less material transfers, compared with siblings who
did not receive a marital gift. In contrast, children who received educational transfers
– proxied with the educational attainment of the child – spend less time with their
parents but provide more financial support. Children with a financed college degree
spend almost 4 fewer visits per month, on average, while the transfer probability is 16
p.p. higher and the transfer amount is more than twice as much, compared to illiterate
children who received no educational transfer.
As our second main set of results, we show that parental transfers matter for the
residential choices of children to stay close to the parents or to move further away.
Applying a linear family-time fixed effect model, we find that received marital transfers
discourages migration: children who received a money gift for their marriage are 6.5
p.p. more likely to live in the same neighborhood, while this is even 16 p.p. higher if
they received a house. In contrast, they are 9.2 and 15.7 p.p. less likely to live in a
different town if they received a money gift or a house, respectively. Further, high levels
of educational transfers decrease the chance of living close to one’s parents. We find that
the higher educated the child is, the lower the probability that the child lives in the same
neighborhood, and conversely, the higher the probability to live in a different town. For
2Filial piety (xiào) is considered a key virtue in Chinese and other Asian countries’ cultures to
respect one’s parents. Confucian ethics regard filial piety as an unconditional obligation of the child,
which requires the child to reciprocate the care one’s parents have given.
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a child with a financed college degree, the likelihood to live in the same neighborhood
is 21.4 p.p. lower – compared to an illiterate child, while the probability to live in
another town is 27.4 p.p. higher. We complement these findings with estimations on
the college sub-sample which allows us to use monetary transfers into education instead
of our proxy variable of educational attainment. Finally, we study heterogeneous effects
which broadly confirm our main findings.
There exists a long-standing literature on inter-generational family transfers.3 The
majority of studies focus on inter-vivo transfers and bequests behavior of the parents
in exchange for children’s support at older ages, see, e.g., Alessie, Angelini, and Pasini
(2014), Norton, Nicholas, and Huang (2013) and Groneck (2016). We complement this
work by studying the impact of parental transfers to their children at early life on the
child’s support to their parents at old-age. By making use of recall questions we are able
to link transfers from the past to behavior happening many years later. Our study is
related to a small line of research with similar data availability, see Ho (2019), Ciani and
Deiana (2017), and Cunningham, Yount, Engelman, and Agree (2013). Most closely
related to our study of China is Ho (2019), who studies the gender-differences of the
impact of parental investments in college education and marriage on old-age support.
We extend this work in several dimensions. First, we highlight the channel of residential
decision through which the reciprocal exchange is likely to work. Second, based on
the hypothesized mechanism, we focus on the differential effects of these two kinds of
transfers on children’s help in time versus help in money. Third, we focus on the whole
population by adopting educational attainment to proxy educational investment and
improve methodologically by controlling for time-varying family fixed effect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data,
describes the variables and shows some descriptive statistics. The empirical models
are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents our main results and Section 5 explores
heterogeneity of our results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.1 Data
We use data from China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), an
ongoing micro-longitudinal survey which is nationally representative of Chinese older
population aged 45 and above. CHARLS is the sister data set of Health and Retire-
ment Study (HRS), Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and
English Longitudinal Study of Aging (ELSA). CHARLS contains rich information on
demographic characteristics, health status, health care and insurance, retirement and
pensions, work and incomes, as well as on the family structure and interpersonal trans-
fers. The main surveys start from 2011, and they are conducted biennially by face-to-face
3See Becker (1974), Cox (1987), Cigno (1993), and Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1986). Nugent
(1985) and Cigno (1993) study the importance of children for old-age security
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Table 1: Family Size – Distribution at the Household-level
No. of children 1 2 3 4 5 6+ Obs
Rural 4.8% 32.7% 27.7% 17.4% 10.4% 7.1% 5,078
Urban 12.8% 35.3% 23.5% 15.5% 7.2% 5.7% 2,949
Overall 7.7% 33.7% 26.1% 16.7% 9.2% 6.6% 8,027
Note: Fraction of families depending on the number of children for rural and urban families and overall.
computer-assisted interviews. Details of the survey design, sampling procedure and sam-
ples please see Zhao et al. (2013) and Chen, Smith, Strauss, Wang, and Zhao (2017).
Since living arrangement and intergenerational transfers information in 2011 wave
are not comparable with those in later waves, we employ data from 2013 and 2015 waves
to conduct child-level analyses. We treat respondents as parents. There is one family
respondent per household in each interview and the respondent’s spouse (if present).
Questions related to children, intergenerational transfers between parents and each child
and past marriage gifts offered to each child (if the child has ever married) are asked to
the family respondent. The data allows us to treat each child in a family as the unit of
observation and to analyze the child-level and variation between siblings.
Important sample selections are made, such as excluding never married children and
co-resident children, keeping only biological children, and dropping single child families,
which results in a final sample of 29,604 child-year observations of 18,017 children from
7,406 families, cf. Table A1 in Appendix A. Table 1 shows the distribution of family size
by rural/urban households. Contrary to common belief, the generation that we study
does not mainly consist of one-child families in either rural area or urban area. On the
contrary, only 7.7% of families have only one child. Children in our sample were mostly
(i.e. 66%) born prior to the introduction of the one-child policy which was introduced
in 1979. In addition, various exemption rules especially for rural households, and ethnic
minorities applied (Wu & Li, 2011). In our fixed-effects analysis, we explore within-
family variation such that single-child families are not taken into account. This amounts
to dropping 3% of observations.
2.2 Variables
2.2.1 Dependent Variables
We next describe the variables used to estimate the two main regression equations which
uses two sets of dependent variables: In the first equation, we estimate parental transfers
on various variables of support by the children. Second, we estimate transfers from the
parents on various measures on the proximity of children’s residence with respect to their
parents.
Support Variables from the Child There are four measures of support from the
child to the parent, including time transfers and material transfers. The variable Visit
frequency represents the number of monthly visits to parents from non-coresident chil-
4
dren. Recall that we drop cohabiting children, since this variable would not be defined
for them. Paying visits to parents incurs time cost especially for those who live far away
from their parents. The variable Whether future help is an indicator variable taken from
the following question:
”Suppose that in the future, you needed help with basic daily activities like eat-
ing or dressing. Do you have relatives or friends (besides your spouse/partner)
who would be willing and able to help you over a long period of time? What
is the relationship to you of that person or those persons?”
The variable represents parent’s expectations about the help in activities of daily living
(ADL) they expect to receive from their children in the future when they are in need of
long term care.
Material support is measured at the extensive and the intensive margin. Whether
material support is an indicator variable whether children transferred money or in kinds
to the parents in the year before the interview. The amount of material support is the
amount of money and in kind transfers provided over the previous year in 10,000 yuan.4
These questions are:
”In the past year, how much economic supports did you or your spouse receive
from your [child’s name]? Money support such as helping with living expenses
and in kind support includes food or clothes.”
Residential Choice To measure residence choice, we use three dummy variables that
represent an increasing distance between children and their parents. The closest and the
furthest measures are taken as the outcome variables of children’s residence decisions
for our analysis. Same neighborhood is an indicator variable which equals one when the
child lives in the same village/neighborhood as their parents. Same town equals one
when the child lives in the same county/city, but not in the same village/neighborhood
with their parents. Different town takes a value of one when the child and parents
live in different counties/cities, which represents the furthest child-parent distance that
we measure. These three dummy variables cover all living proximity possibilities, and
depict an increasing distance to parents. Respondents were asked ”Where does the child
normally live now?”.
2.2.2 Main Independent Variables: Transfer Variables from Parent
Marital Transfers Marriage gifts are past intergenerational transfers taken from the
main questionaire of CHARLS. It is mainly transferred by parents to their own children,
for a support purpose. The transfer is taken as the marriage investment that parents
make in each child. Marriage transfers are composed of two parts, namely money trans-
fers and a house as a gift. Such variables are based on the following questions:
4Natural logarithm of the actual amount is used in empirical analysis.
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”Did you give betrothal gifts when [child name] got married?
Did you buy a house for him/her when [child name] got married?
At that time, how much was the total value of the betrothal gifts/the house?”
The two main explanatory variables used in subsequent analyses are indicator vari-
ables Marital transfer, monetary and Marital transfer, house, which indicate whether
the child received only a monetary transfer, or whether the child received a house -
potentially. Note, that the indicator variable for the house does not exclude additional
monetary transfers.
It is important to note, that the marital gift question is a recall variable from a
time potentially many years ago. The average birth year of the parents is 1946 and the
average year when the child first get married is 1997. It means that 69 years old parents
have to remember the amount of marital transfers that is 18 years ago, on average. In
addition, most families have more than one child, as showed before, which makes it
more difficult for old parents to recall the exact number transferred to each child. It is
noticeable in the panel data that many parents reported different values for the same
child across waves.5 The marital transfer amount might also suffer from measurement
error as other self-reported monetary variables, such as wealth, income and expenditure.
The binary variables are chose as main explanatory variables, as they are considered as
more reliable.6
Educational Investments We do not have detailed information about the amount
invested into children’s education under college. However, more years of education sub-
ject to higher schooling related costs and indirect opportunity costs. Letting children go
to school longer entails opportunity costs of forgone labor, which is especially the case
in rural China where children often start to work and support the family at a young age
due to financial constraints.
In our main analysis, we proxy parental investment into children’s education by the
educational outcome of each child, reflecting the intrahousehold resource allocation in
education, especially between siblings.7 As mentioned above, we do have information
about parental investment into college education for the subsample of children who went
to college. In order to analyse the full sample of children across all educational groups,
we combine both information into a six-category variable. These categories are (1)
illiterate, (2) primary school, (3) secondary school, (4) high school degree, (5) college
degree without financial help from parents, and (6) college degree with financial help
from parents.
As a second variable, we additionally use the natural logarithm of the actual amount
of investment into college education which we analyze for the subsample of children with
college degree only.
5We take the average value of these children when the amount variable is used in analysis.
6Binary variables are able to capture sufficient variation within families, as presented later in descrip-
tive statistics.
7Similar proxies have been used in other studies, e.g. Brown and Park (2002) measure educational
investment with the number of years of schooling.
6
2.2.3 Control Variables
As our control variables, we use important child characteristics such as age, gender,
marital status, birth order, and having siblings with the same gender. Gender is highly
correlated with parental transfers, since sons receive much higher educational investment
and marital transfers than daughters. Birth order captures part of the innate ability,
given the findings that birth order affects earnings and intelligence quotient (Black,
Devereux, & Salvanes, 2005; Barclay, 2015).8 Whether having same gender sibling is
relevant in the sense that only children in their gender group, especially only sons,
culturally carry support duties.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
In the following, we present some statistics about the distribution of marital transfers,
old age-support and living proximity within families.
Table 2: Marital Transfers and its Distribution∗
Child level
No transfer 38.8%
Prop. money transfer 52.5%
Amount (if > 0) 12,634
Prop. house transfer 8.8%
Amount (if > 0) 108,115
Family level
No transfer to any child 24.7%
Prop. money transfer 59.9%
Amount (if > 0) 23,221.51
Prop. house transfer 15.4%
Amount (if > 0) 155,124
Families with positive transfers
Equal positive amounts 6.7%
Unequal positive amounts∗∗ 48.8%
Some zero, equal positive amts 3.1%
Some zero, unequal positive amts∗∗ 18.2%
Some zero, one positive 23.1%
Note: Monetary values are measured in RMB yuan in 2015 value (1000 yuan
equals approx. 150USD). ∗Child is ever married such that the marital transfer
decision has been made. ∗∗Within the group of families with at least two
unequal positive transfers, the largest positive transfer is at least twice as
much as the smallest positive transfer in 71% of families.
Parental Investments Table 2 shows the transfer behavior of parents for the marriage
of their children and the within household distribution. The table reveals that marital
8Innate ability of the child would cause an endogeneity problem, which will be discussed later.
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transfers are very prevalent in China: gifts are granted in 80% of families and 60%
of children receive it. On average, children receive 25,418 yuan. Turning to families
with positive transfers allows to analyze the distribution of gifts. Interestingly, the vast
majority of families – 93 percent – distributes marital gifts unequally among the children.
Further, 44 percent of parents only support some of their children while others receive
nothing, whose variance could be captured by the gift/no gift dummy variable.









College and above 9.5%
Children with College degree
College financed by parents 63.8%
Amount (if > 0) 70,117
Family∗∗
Equal education 38.2%
No higher than medium education 45.7%
Some medium education, some highly educated 11.1%
Some lowly educated, some highly educated 5.0%
Note: Monetary values are measured in RMB yuan in 2015 value (1000 yuan equals approx.
150USD). ∗Child is at least 20 such that education is likely to be completed. ∗∗Equal education
is calculated based on the six categories from illiterate to college financed. Category ”No higher
than medium education” contains families with children who are all unequally lowly educated, all
unequally medium educated, and some lowly educated, some medium educated.
Table 3 shows the educational investment received by children and the within house-
hold distribution. Most children, 77% of all children, have secondary school degree or
less. Less than 10 percent of children are highly educated, namely attended college and
above. When we look at the group who are influenced by the mandatory education law,
there are still around 40% of them do not obtain secondary school degree.9 The middle
part of Table 3 shows that among those children with a college degree 64 percent were
supported by their parents with 70,000 yuan, on average.
Educational investment is also unevenly distributed within families. Only 38 percent
of families have equal educational investment. There are even 5% of families have both
primary or less educated children and college educated children. The summary statis-
tics support the argument that many children stopped schooling early, sometimes even
earlier than required, and that parents make unequal investment decisions in children’s
9The mandatory education law was introduced in 1985, and it is supposed to impact those who were
younger than 15 at the time (Fang, Eggleston, Rizzo, Rozelle, & Zeckhauser, 2012).
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education at all levels.
Table 4 shows that marital transfers are correlated with children’s demographics, in
particular with gender and birth order. Our statistics show that sons and older siblings
tend to have a higher probability of receiving marital support from parents. If a child
has no same-gender sibling, s/he has a higher probability of receiving marital gifts. We
do not see a substitution effect between marital transfers and educational ’investments’
by parents in the descriptive statistics of Table 4. Higher educated children are more
likely to receive marriage related gifts than their less educated counterparts. However,
this might be driven by generally better economic conditions of the families with higher
educated children.
Table 4: Marital Transfers and Child Characteristics
Gifts No gifts Diff
Age 39.52 41.12 ***
Prop. male 0.49 0.31 ***
Birth order 2.20 2.48 ***
Only son/daughter 0.25 0.20 ***
Nr. of children in family 3.71 4.17 ***
Educational investment ***
Prop. illiterate 0.05 0.09
Prop. primary school 0.37 0.40
Prop. secondary school 0.35 0.29
Prop. high school 0.14 0.12
Prop. college unfinanced 0.03 0.04
Prop. college financed 0.06 0.06
Observations 18,420 11,184
Note: Means, and the significance of the difference between
means are reported. The significance of means difference
is based on S.E. clustered at the household level. Received
gifts is defined as received either monetary or house gift.
Support from Children Table 5 shows that most children support parents in forms
of time and money. Almost every child pays visits to parents, and half of children
are expected to provide care to parents in the future when help is needed. Since the
proportion of children who do not visit parents is very small, we do not consider a two
part model for visit frequency. 74 percent of children support parents financially, with
an average amount of 1962 yuan in the last year. The conditional mean of the amount of
financial transfer is much greater than the median, and there are some children transfer
rather large amounts of financial support. The right-skewed distribution of financial
transfer suggests a logarithmic transformation in later empirical analysis.
The distribution of support within families show quite large between-siblings differ-
ences. Most siblings visit parents and provide material support to parents, but with
different frequencies (84% of families) and different amounts (83% of families). Future
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help is expected from only half of children, while it is more evenly distributed within
families. It seems that parents tend to believe that all children would provide ADL help
in the future, if they expect help from children. Parents might also expect more equal
help than they actually receive.
There is a complementarity between paying visits and providing future ADL help
(corr.=0.11), and a substitution between visits and the incidence of material transfer
(corr.=-0.09). Children who visit parents more often seem to also provide ADL help in
the future but transfer less money.
Table 5: Child Support
Support in Time - Child
No visits 3.2%
Visit frequency (if > 0) 7.2
Future help expected 48.2%
Support in Money - Child
Financial transfers 74.0%
Mean (if > 0) 1,962
Median (if > 0) 1,000
75th percentile (if > 0) 2,000
85th percentile (if > 0) 3,000
95th percentile (if > 0) 7,000
99th percentile (if > 0) 20,000
Family
Unequal visit behavior 84.3%
Unequal exp. future help 21.5%
Unequal financial transfers∗ 83.0%
Note: Monetary values are measured in RMB yuan (1000 yuan equals approx.
150USD). Visit frequency refers to the number of visits per month. Financial
transfer refers to the material support during the past year of the interview.
∗Within the group of families with unequal financial transfers, the largest
transfer is at least twice as much as the smallest positive transfer in 68% of
families.
The Importance of Residential Choice Living close to one’s parents not only in-
creases the probability of providing instrumental help (Yan, Chen, & Yang, 2003), but
also fulfills the filial piety and improves parental well-being in China (Chen & Silver-
stein, 2000). There are on average 44% of children living in the same household or
neighborhood as their parents. Having at least one child living close is the case for the
vast majority of 72 percent of families.10
Table 6 shows how various measures of children’s support, marital gifts and educa-
tional attainments differ by living proximity to one’s parents. We depict averages for
three sets of children, which includes living in the same neighborhood with their parents,
10Statistics are based on the sample without the co-resident children selection.
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Table 6: Living Proximity, Parental Transfers, and Old-age Support
Same neighborhood Same town Diff town
Old-age support
Frequency of visits 15.71 4.43 1.23
Prop. future help 0.51 0.48 0.46
Prop. material transfer 0.67 0.77 0.77
Amt material transfer (if > 0) 1,340 1,599 3,020
Marital transfers
Prop. money transfer 0.65 0.60 0.57
Prop. house transfer 0.16 0.05 0.07
Prop. either transfer 0.68 0.61 0.58
Educational investment
Illiterate 0.08 0.08 0.04
Primary 0.45 0.36 0.33
Secondary 0.33 0.32 0.33
High 0.11 0.14 0.13
College unfinanced 0.02 0.04 0.05
College financed 0.02 0.05 0.12
Observations 9,274 11,543 8,787
Fraction of all children 31.3% 39.0% 29.7%
Note: Means in different residence groups are reported. The three residential choice
measures are mutually exclusive, as defined before in the Dependent Variables section.
Monetary values are measured in RMB yuan (1000 yuan equals approx. 150USD).
living in the same town, but a different neighborhood, and living in another town than
their parents.
As expected, children’s living proximity to parents is correlated with the kind and
the amount of old-age support the children provide. Living in a different town with one’s
parents, rather than living in the same neighborhood, indicates a reduction of 14 visits
per month, and a 5 percentage point lower expected probability of receiving care in case
needed in the future. In contrast, children who live in the same neighborhood with their
parents are 10 pp less likely to provide financial aid to their parents. This might be due
to the fact that children who live close give up better job opportunities in other places
implying lower earnings than their migrated siblings.
Consistent with previous discussion, Table 6 shows that children who received mari-
tal gifts from their parents are more likely to live close by their parents - the proportions
of children who received marital gifts are larger in groups living closer. The largest dif-
ference is 10 percentage points. In contrast, children with higher educational attainment
tend to live further away from their parents. Only 4% of children are college educated
among those who live in the same neighborhood, whereas the number amounts to 17%
among children living in another town.
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3 Empirical Model
As our main analysis we investigate the impact of parental support for the marriage
and for the education of the child on (a) the children’s support to their parents later in
life, and (b) the children’s location decision as the main mechanism affecting the kind
of old-age support by the children.
In particular, we estimate three main regressions: First, we estimate the impact of
parental investment into the children via marital transfers and via educational support on
the children’s decisions to support the parents both in time and with money. Second, we
estimate both parental investment decisions on the child’s decision to migrate. For both
of these equations, we focus on whether parents gave gifts for the children’s marriage,
as well as the educational degree of the children as a proxy for the outcome of parental
investment into children’s education. This is due to the fact that the absolute amount
of marital gifts is not fully reliable. In addition, the absolute amount of investment into
children’s education is only available for a small subset of households. To specifically
analyze the impact of actual amounts both for marital transfers and for educational
investment, we, third, analyze the amount of parental investment by focusing on the
subsample of children with college degree. Here, we can estimate the monetary amount
both for a marital gift and for financing the children’s college education on the child’s
reciprocal behavior towards the parent, both in terms of time and money, and on the
child’s residence choice.
Estimating parental investment variables on children’s support and on children’s
residential decisions suffer from endogeneity problems. In more altruistic families, par-
ents might invest more into their children and children might simultaneously help their
parents more. An estimated impact of parental investment decisions on children’s help
might, hence, be biased by this unobserved endogeneity. To control for these unobserved
variables, we employ a family fixed effect model, which we also allow to change over time.
Hence, in effect, we set up a family-time fixed effect model.
To investigate the impact of parental investments on children’s help, we estimate the
following model for child i in family h at time t






ihtβ̃ + εiht. (1)
The dependent variable supportiht ∈ {Visiting frequency,Whether future help,
Whether material support,Ln amount of material support} denotes intergenerational old
age support provided by child i from family h in year t to the parents. As outlined in
Section 2.2.1, we investigate four different variables. Two variables, Visiting frequency,
and Whether future help represent the help in time. Material support - both at the
extensive and at the intensive margin - represents the children’s help in kind and with
money.
The amount of material support is censored at zero given that many children did not
provide material support. Thus, a two-part model is employed in analyses of material
support. A linear probability model is used in the first part. In the second part, an OLS
with natural logarithm transformed dependent variable is employed on the sample with
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positive transfers. We estimate the extensive and the intensive margins independently.11
Our main independent variables are the parents investment variables. Denote by
mih ∈ {Marital money transfer,Marital house transfer} two indicator variables whether
child i received a marital gift - either monetary, or a house - in family h. eih are binary
variables indicating the educational attainment of the child, ranging from illiterate -
which will be the reference group that is left out -, primary-, secondary-, and high
school, to unfinanced and financed college degree, cf. Section 2.2.2. These variables are
our proxies for the parental investment into the children’s education.
We expect β1 > 0 for the children’s help in time, represented by Visiting frequency,
and Whether future help, whereas we expect β1 < 0 for the children’s help in money.
We conjecture that parents can influence the children’s help in time by generous mar-
ital transfers. At the same time, we hypothesize that the coefficients β2 for (higher)
educational attainment will be negative for children’s help in time relative to illiterate
children, while it will be positive with respect to children’s help in money.
xiht captures child characteristics, including child’s age, age square, gender, birth
order, whether having same gender siblings dummy, and marital status.
αht denotes the unobserved family-time effect and represents time-variant unobserved
fixed family shared values which may determine both parental investments and old-age
support. Family-time fixed effect αht represents time-variant observed characteristics
such as parental wealth and unobserved shared family values which may determine
parental investments and also influence old age support. For example, in a more al-
truistic family, parents invest more in children and children tend to repay more. This
generosity or altruism not only generate positive correlation between investments and
return, but also reinforce the estimated correlation. The time-variant feature further
allows such generosity to change over time. Note, that introducing this time-fixed effect
implies that we only analyze variation between siblings within a household. However,
all variation over time and all fixed family characteristics are captured in the term αht.
εiht is an idiosyncratic error term. Identification assumption that mgih and eih may
not be correlated with the error term εiht needs to be made. In the family-time fixed
effect model, family-time effect αht is allowed to be correlated with the explanatory
variables.
As our second main equation, we estimate the impact of parental investments on
children’s decision to live close by or far away from one’s parents by applying the same
model:






ihtβ̃ + εiht. (2)
To study the main mechanism of the parental investment decision on children’s help-
ing behavior, we here use residenceiht ∈ {same neighborhood, different town} as our de-
pendent variable which indicates the child’s place of residence compared to the parents.
As outlined in Section 2.2.1, residenceiht consist of two indicator variables representing
11Tobit is not adopted since it requires estimates on transfer decision and conditional transfer amount
to be in the same direction, which is likely to be violated by the predictions of exchange motive. The
logarithmic transformation is employed because of the right-skewed distribution of positive transfers.
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the shortest and the furthest distance to one’s parents. The remaining elements are the
same as in Equation (1).
As our main hypothesis, we expect positive coefficients for β1 if same neighborhood is
used as the dependent variable, while we expect β1 < 0 for different town. Analogously,
we expect increasingly negative coefficient for higher educational attainments for same
neighborhood as the dependent variable, while the opposite gradient is expected for
different town.
Finally, we use the monetary amount of the parental gift as well as for the investment
into the college education for the subsample of children with a college degree. We
estimate a random effect model instead of a preferred fixed effect model, since there are
only few families with multiple college educated children would contribute effectively to
the estimation.
Outcomeiht = β0 +mg
amt
ih β1 + e
amt




htγ + αht + εiht. (3)
where Outcomeiht refers to supportiht and residenceiht defined above. mg
amt
ih and
eamtih stand for the natural logarithm of the monetary amount paid for the marital gift
and for the children’s college education. Note, that here, we do not distinguish between
monetary transfers and a house gift and simply take the absolute value.12. The additional
term zht represents parental level information, including the eldest parental age, age
square, responding parental gender, work status, marital status, the number of children,
parental highest educational attainment, residence type urban or rural, pension type,
and region dummies. αht denotes the time-variant family effect, which is assumed to
be uncorrelated with explanatory variables, thus random. We check the validity of the
assumption by running the robust version of Hausman test as proposed by Mundlak
(1978) and Wooldridge (2010), see section 10.7.3 in Wooldridge (2010). Test results
support the random family effect assumption in the college subsample in almost all
regressions, except the regression on the incidence of material support, where fixed effect
and random effect results are found to be nevertheless qualitatively the same.
4 Main Results
4.1 Old-age Support
Results of our first equation (1) are presented in Table 7. Compared to siblings who
received no gift, children who received a house transfer are spending 3 additional visit
per month with their parents, on average, they have a 3 p.p. higher probability of
providing future help, and they reduce material transfer by 25% per year to their parents,
conditional on transferring.13 Children who received money gifts behave in a similar
way with smaller absolute magnitudes of changes. In line with our hypotheses, marital
12Note, that we add one yuan to each observation in order to include zeroes which would otherwise
not be defined
13The percentage change is calculated based on a exponential transformation of the coefficient, i.e.,
100 · (exp(−0.292) − 1) = −25.3%.
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transfers seem to incentivize more time or physical support, but discourage monetary
transfers.
On the contrary, higher educational degrees of the children - used as our measure
of parental investment into education - is associated with a lower frequency of visits,
but seems to greatly stimulate financial support. For instance, received educational
support until high school decreases the number of monthly visits by 1, compared to
illiterate siblings. However, it increases the probability of providing material support
by 10 p.p.. There is a clear gradient of the level of educational attainment on the
magnitude of visits, the probability to provide material transfers, and the amount of
material transfers, going in opposite directions: the higher educated the child, the lower
the number of visits and the higher the probability and the amount to provide financial
transfers to the parents. This pattern, albeit less clear-cut, is also visible for whether
future help, in particular when comparing college vs. non-college educated children: the
coefficients turn significantly negative for college educated children.
To sum up, the results show the different returns of marital transfer and educational
investment, where the former contributes to time support and the latter stimulates
material transfer.
4.2 Residential Choice
The child’s decision of where to live directly influences potential support possibilities of
the parents. Children who move further away - likely due to higher earning potentials -
are more likely to help their parents in kinds whereas children who stayed close to their
parents are more likely to help in time. In this section, we explore residential choice
as the underlying mechanism of the associations between parental transfers and old-age
supports observed in the previous section. We again apply a family time-fixed effect
model, and show the effect of parental transfers on residential choice in Table 8.
Received money transfer is associated with a 7 p.p. higher probability of living in the
same neighborhood, and a 9 p.p. lower probability of living a different town, compared to
received no transfer. Received a house as marital gifts correlates with living in the same
neighborhood and living in a different town in the same directions as received money
transfer does, but the absolute magnitudes are much larger. Hence, marital transfers
in the past have increased the likelihood of children to stay close to their parents. The
results indicate that living within the town boarder, especially in the same neighborhood,
could be considered as staying close.
Children’s educational attainment which we use as a proxy for parents investment
into children’s education shows a pronounced gradient with respect to the place of resi-
dence of children relative to their parents. Overall, higher educational attainments are
significantly correlated with a higher probability of migrating to a different town, and a
lower probability of staying in the same neighborhood. Compared with children with no
formal education, children with a high school degree have a 10 p.p. higher likelihood of
migrating to a different town, and a 8 p.p. lower likelihood of living in the same neigh-
borhood. Children who attended college with (without) financing from their parents are
21 (23) p.p. less likely of living in the same neighborhood and 27 (21) p.p. more likely
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material support if > 0
Marital transfers
Money 0.853∗∗∗ 0.012∗ −0.002 −0.122∗∗∗
(2.96) (1.84) (−0.17) (−4.73)
House 2.828∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ −0.004 −0.292∗∗∗
(5.47) (2.49) (−0.24) (−6.75)
Educational investments
(reference group: Illiterate)
Primary school 0.637 0.006 0.028∗∗ 0.092∗∗
(1.44) (0.67) (1.98) (2.26)
Secondary school −0.041 0.011 0.058∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(−0.08) (1.02) (3.73) (4.52)
High school −1.186∗∗ 0.011 0.095∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(−2.07) (0.95) (5.53) (7.40)
College unfinanced −4.375∗∗∗ −0.026 0.150∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗
(−5.96) (−1.62) (6.34) (9.27)
College financed −3.959∗∗∗ −0.027∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗
(−5.93) (−1.77) (7.56) (12.79)
Family-time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,604 29,604 29,604 21,905
R-squared∗ 0.067 0.034 0.029 0.062
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Dependent variable old-age support includes visit frequency, whether providing future
help, whether transferring material support, and the amount of material support if trans-
fer. Control variables of the child consist of child’s gender, age, age square, birth order,
whether having same gender siblings, and marital status. Standard errors are clustered at
the household level. ∗Within R-squared is reported.
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Table 8: Parental Transfers and Residential Choice








Primary school 0.014 0.031∗
(0.76) (1.94)
Secondary school -0.031 0.068∗∗∗
(-1.53) (3.73)
High school -0.084∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(-3.68) (4.84)
College unfinanced -0.227∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(-7.57) (6.67)
College financed -0.214∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(-8.23) (10.01)
Family-time fixed effect Yes Yes
Child controls Yes Yes
Observations 29,604 29,604
R-squared∗ 0.133 0.042
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Dependent variable residential choice includes living in the
same village/neighborhood and living in a different county/city.
Control variables of the child consist of child’s gender, age, age
square, birth order, whether having same gender siblings, and
marital status. Standard errors are clustered at the household
level. ∗Within R-squared is reported.
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of living in a different town than their parents. Overall, our results show that living
proximity decreases with educational investment.
4.3 Amount of Parental Transfers
In the previous analyses we used educational attainment as a proxy for the investment
of parents into the child’s education. In order to directly compare the actual amounts
invested both into marital transfers and into the education of the child, we now focus on
the subsample of children with college degree. College expenses are the only available
schooling expenditure. Hence, information simultaneously on the amount of both marital
transfer and educational investments is only available for this subsample.
The analysis of the amount of parental transfers allows us to compute the marginal
return of transfers in old-age support and living proximity. Results shown in Panel A in
Table 9 indicate that a 1 percent increase of marital transfers increases the frequency of
visits by 0.15 significantly. The effect of marital transfers on material support is close
to zero at the extensive margin and slightly negative, but both coefficients are highly
insignificant.
Consistent with our hypothesis, a 1 percent increase in college expenses is significantly
associated with a 0.02 percent increase in the amount of material support, and the
probability of material support is increased by college expenses, albeit only significant
at the 10 percent level. Moreover, both time supports tend to be negatively correlated
with college expenses. In essence, the amount of college investment is found to be
negatively linked with time help, but positively correlated with material support.
The association with residence choice is more significantly in line with our hypotheses,
as shown in Panel B in Table 9. Higher marital transfer decreases the probability of living
in a different town. In contrast, a child who received more college expense is less likely
to live in the same neighborhood, but has a higher probability of moving to a different
town.
4.4 Discussion of the Mechanism
Consistent with our proposed mechanism, marital transfer and educational investment
have differential relations with residence choice, as shown in both the full sample and the
college subsample. Marital transfer decreases the opportunity cost of time by encourag-
ing close living proximity, thus allows more time transfer. High educational investment,
in contrast, is linked with a larger distance between children and parents due to migra-
tion, which brings higher child income and higher in kind transfer.
A mediation analysis is performed by including living proximity variables as media-
tors in the support regressions, to test the residential choice pathway. Comparing results
before and after the mediation in Table B4, living proximity seems to explain away a
large part of the associations, especially the positive association between marital gifts
and time support. Marital gifts increase time support mainly, if not entirely, through
encouraging closer residences of children. The negative impact of educational investment
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Table 9: The Amount of Parental Transfers







material support if >0
ln(Amt marital gifts+1) 0.153∗∗∗ 0.003 0.001 -0.010
(3.05) (1.37) (0.35) (-1.41)
ln(Amt college expense+1) -0.080 -0.001 0.004∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(-1.46) (-0.55) (1.72) (3.64)
Family-time random effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parental controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,258 2,258 2,258 1,775
R-squared∗ 0.133 0.066 0.058 0.112
Panel B: Residential Choice
Same neighborhood Different town
ln(Amt marital gifts+1) 0.002 -0.014∗∗∗
(1.39) (-4.96)
ln(Amt college expense+1) -0.006∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(-3.35) (4.00)
Family-time random effect Yes Yes
Child controls Yes Yes
Parental controls Yes Yes
Observations 2,258 2,258
R-squared∗ 0.089 0.142
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Dependent variable old-age support includes visit frequency, whether providing future help,
whether transferring material support, and the amount of material support if transfer. Dependent
variable residential choice includes living in the same village/neighborhood and living in a different
county/city. Child controls include child’s gender, age, age square, birth order, whether having
same gender siblings, and marital status. Controlled parental characteristics include parental age,
age square, gender, work status, marital status, the number of children, educational attainment,
residence type urban or rural, pension type, and region dummies. Standard errors are clustered at
the household level. ∗Overall R-squared is reported.
19
on time transfer is also largely gone due to the inclusion of residential choice. The living
proximity measures powerfully determinate children’s time support.
The indirect impact through residence choice is less strong in determining material
transfer. Around a quarter of marital gifts’ negative impact on the amount of material
transfer could be accounted by living proximity, while the positive impact of educational
investment on monetary support is only slightly influenced by the inclusion of living
proximity terms. It is possible that the measures of living proximity we take, which
are classified based on neighborhood and town, are less accurate in representing the
income effect of job-related migration. Distinguishing children by more accurate distance
measure or by detailed migration destination information would help further explaining
the observed pattern.14
Among siblings who live similarly close, those who received higher educational in-
vestment still provide more material support. The reason can be various. First of all,
higher educational investment contributes to higher educational attainment and thus
higher income among siblings who live in the same proximity. In addition to the income
effect from migration, the higher income regardless of living proximity likely discourages
physical care provision by higher opportunity cost, and encourages monetary transfer
due to lower marginal cost. Higher educated children may further choose to substitute
time support with money.
Second, children who received more educational investment may transfer more money
due to greater altruism towards parents, in additional to the residence pathway and the
direct income effect. Parental investment can shape children’s preference in younger
age, and children can be manipulated to be more altruistic towards parents (Becker,
Murphy, & Spenkuch, 2016). Therefore, more support would be provided by children
who are manipulated to be more altruistic, which is unnecessarily a result of higher
income. Additionally including child income as a mediator only explains part of the
remaining correlation, which supports both the direct income effect and the altruism
effect discussed above.15
The remaining negative correlation between marital gifts and monetary transfer after
mediation points to potential endogeneity.16 Although we adopt family time fixed effect
to account for time-variant unobserved fixed family shared values, and include child
controls such as birth order and gender, it is difficult to control for child-level unobserved
factors. Unobserved child characteristics, such as endowed altruism and ability, are likely
to be observable to parents and consequently impact parental investment decisions. Old-
14For instance, siblings who are classified as living the furthest can still be heterogeneous in the sense
that some may live in the neighbor town whereas some may live in a metropolis. Consequently, the
income gain brought by migration would be different.
15Results are available upon request. When additionally controlling for last year’s income of the child
and the child’s spouse, the higher educated still provide more monetary support. One possible reason
could be that the income we measure is a bad proxy for life-time income. Highly educated children
would support parents financially due to their higher prospective life-time income, however, their early
stage career during the survey implies a low contemporary income.
16Similar to the argument of Ho (2019), part of the negative impact between marital transfers and
material support can be potentially accounted by the higher bargaining power of children-in-law resulting
from higher marital transfer.
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age support led by these child characteristics would then be mistaken for a result of
parental transfers. If children who received marital gifts are those with low ability, even
after controlling for their residence, they would be less capable of providing material
support.
The observed relationship between different parental transfers and different supports
is likely to be a mixed outcome of the potential mechanisms mentioned above. Although
the motive could be mixed, the residence pathway certainly provides insights on the
observed intergenerational interaction. As illustrated in our analysis, residential choice
shows significant correlation with two different kinds of parental investment, and reflects
crucial elements which determine the kind and the amount of old-age support. Residence
decision also explains away a large part of the observed differential correlations between
parental investments and supports as expected.
5 Heterogeneity
After having established our main results we want to investigate heterogeneous effects
in this section. We do so in two dimensions: First, we conjecture that evidence from
rural families and rural-urban migration can better support our proposed mechanism,
since a large fraction of rural residents migrate into cities which prevents them from
taking care (in time) of their parents but allows remittances back home. Second, given
the traditional gender role of sons as supporters to old parents in China, it is of question
whether the hypothesized pattern can only be observed among sons and whether sons’
marginal support return is greater than daughters’.
5.1 Living Proximity and Rural-urban Migration
We consider the rural sample, whose parents live in rural areas, to study the unique
location choice of rural children – both physical distance with parents and rural/urban
residence. To obtain better job opportunities and a higher income, usually by working
in an non-agricultural sector, a rural child would move to an urban area. Urban places
can either be close, such as a town center in the same county, or be further, such as a
city in another province. Therefore, rural children can opt for urban lives whereas still
stay relatively close. To explore how parental transfer impact rural children’s residence
choices, we take the rural-urban migration into consideration.17
Many rural children choose to migrate to urban areas whereas stay relatively close
to take care of parents. This is especially true nowadays with the popular rural-urban
migration and strong filial values in China. In Table 10, we consider the residence choice
of children whose parents currently live in villages (19305). Around 1/3 of rural children
17A household is classified as a rural household if parents have current rural residence, which comes
from the interviewer recorded residence type of the household during surveys. We define rural-urban
migrants as children who come from rural households and currently live in urban regions outside the
village.
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Table 10: Rural Children’s Residence Type and Distance Choices
Same village Same county Diff. county Obs
Rural-urban migrant 0 60.6% 39.4% 6,619
Non rural-urban migrant 48.3% 38.0% 13.7% 12,686
Fraction 31.7% 38.5% 29.8% 19,305
Note: Children whose parents currently live in rural areas are defined as rural children. Rural-
urban migrants (non rural-urban migrants) refer to rural children who live in urban (rural) regions.
moved from rural to urban (6619), and 60.6% of them live in the same county. Among
those who stayed in rural places (12686), only 13.7% live in a different county.
Different kinds of parental transfer may function differently on residence type and
distance choice, although moving to urban cities and living further are positively cor-
related. Our theory suggests that marital gifts mainly shorten the physical distance
between children and parents, which allows more time support, rather than discourag-
ing urban residence. Therefore, conditional on the rural/urban residence type, marital
gifts should still have a significantly positive impact on living proximity. In contrast, the
impact of educational investment on living proximity could largely come from encour-
aging rural-urban migration. Moving to urban areas could be more necessary for those
higher educated due to job matching and education obtaining purpose.
Corresponding to rows in Table 10, Table 11 reports the relationship between parental
transfers and residential choice, among all rural children, rural children who stay in
rural areas, and rural children who migrate to urban regions, respectively. The first two
columns of all rural children show the link between parental transfers and residential
choice, which contains both residence type and distance choice. Residential decision of
the later two subgroups, rural-urban and non rural-urban migrants, represents only the
distance choice, since their residence type of rural or urban is predetermined.
Within all rural households, received marital transfers significantly increase the prob-
ability of living in the same neighborhood and decrease the probability of living in a
different town, compared with siblings who received no gift. Meanwhile, conditional on
the rural/urban residence choice, marital transfer still increases living proximity. Among
siblings who stay in rural areas, children have a 5 p.p. (11 p.p.) higher chance of living
in the same village, and a 7 p.p. (6 p.p.) lower probability of living in a different county,
if they received money gifts (house gift). Among siblings who migrate to urban towns
or cities, a 7 p.p. (18 p.p.) lower probability of living in a different county is associated
with received money gifts (a house gift). Results show that children who received marital
transfers are encouraged to live closer, despite of the rural-urban migration decision.
In contrast, the size of the negative impact of educational investment on residential
choice becomes smaller when conditional on rural/urban residence type. Siblings from
rural households who received higher educational investment are less likely to live in the
same village with parents, and they are more likely to move out of their parents’ county.
However, when comparing siblings who currently live in villages or siblings who live in
urban cities, educational investment plays a less important role in determining living
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Table 11: Parental Transfers and Living Proximity: Rural-urban Migration
All rural children Non rural-urban migrants
Rural-urban
migrants
VARIABLES Same village Diff county Same village Diff county Diff county
Marital transfers
Money 0.060*** -0.104*** 0.051*** -0.069*** -0.074***
(4.16) (-7.97) (2.73) (-5.15) (-3.32)
House 0.163*** -0.172*** 0.110*** -0.057*** -0.180***
(6.64) (-8.51) (3.68) (-3.23) (-4.15)
Educ. investments
(ref. group: Illiterate)
Primary school 0.009 0.025 -0.008 0.012 0.026
(0.44) (1.39) (-0.39) (0.75) (0.57)
Secondary school -0.052** 0.061*** -0.047* 0.025 -0.004
(-2.25) (2.94) (-1.92) (1.34) (-0.09)
High school -0.125*** 0.103*** -0.041 0.030 0.008
(-4.58) (4.09) (-1.28) (1.34) (0.15)
College unfinanced -0.302*** 0.223*** -0.129 0.042 0.045
(-7.78) (4.61) (-1.49) (0.63) (0.59)
College financed -0.254*** 0.298*** 0.044 0.149** 0.115*
(-8.15) (9.03) (0.54) (2.33) (1.89)
Family-time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,305 19,305 12,686 12,686 6,619
R-squared∗ 0.166 0.049 0.329 0.018 0.035
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Dependent variable living proximity includes whether live in the same village and whether
live in a different county. Control variables of the child consist of child’s gender, age, age square,
birth order, whether having same gender siblings, and marital status. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the household level. ∗Within R-squared is reported.
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proximity. It suggests that children are driven to further locations by education largely
through the rural-urban migration channel.
By focusing on the rural sample, we exclude potential migrant parents who either
move with their children or move alone, from rural to urban areas. Since we discuss
children’s moving decision and its trade-off in better lives and taking care of parents
by analyzing living proximity, we imply that parents stay. If parents currently live in
villages, living proximity more accurately reflects children’s migration decisions.
5.2 Gender Differences
Considering the gender norm in China, sons and daughters might act in a different
way. Since sons usually received more transfers and also provide more support, it is
uncertain whether they marginal reciprocity is higher than their sisters. Conducting
the same group of old-age support regressions by introducing interaction terms between
parental transfers and child’s gender, the gender specific marginal return are visualized
in Figures B1-B2 in appendix.18 The above described patterns are present for both sons
and daughters, albeit more pronounced for sons.
There is no statistically significant difference in the return of marital gifts on supports
between sons and daughters, except on the incidence of material transfer.19 Different
from Ho (2019), who found marriage investment only significantly increases ADL help
among daughters, we find a larger and more significant positive impact on future help
among sons. The difference in findings indicates that there are more sons who received
marital transfers would, or at least being expected by parents to, provide help in the
future. Our result thus suggests no gender difference in the long-term return of marital
gifts in terms of ADL help.
In contrast, the marginal return of educational investment is less equal. Daughters
reciprocate more to parental educational investment in terms of visits and future help,
and sons reciprocate with higher probability of providing financial transfer. However,
sons show a more representative and supportive pattern to our hypotheses, since edu-
cational investment has a more negative impact on sons’ time transfer as hypothesized.
The monetary impact of educational investment is shown to be significantly positive
among both sons and daughters. Noticeably different from our results, Ho (2019) finds
insignificant results in terms of monetary transfer by using college expenses to measure
educational investment, which neglects a large proportion of variation in the educational
investment of non-college-educated children.
Our proposed pathway of residence choice offers an explanation to the observed
gender difference, as shown in Table B3. Daughters’ and sons’ residential choices are
alike in terms of marital gift. Received marital gifts increases the probability of living
in the same neighborhood and decreases the chance of living in a different town among
18The main explanatory variable of marital gifts changes to Whether received either money or house
gift, since very few daughters received a house.
19The interaction term between marital gifts and gender is only marginally significant in the transfer
incidence regression.
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both daughters and sons by same amounts.20 However, only sons’ educational investment
strongly discourages living in the same neighborhood, which is argued to be a crucial
predictor of providing care (Giles & Mu, 2007). Consequently, the negative impact of
educational investment on time support is found among sons.
6 Conclusion
This study analyzes whether and how parental early life transfers, measured as marital
transfer and educational investment, influence children’s support of their parents at
older ages. We empirically examine the links between early life parental transfers, and
residential choices and old-age support of their offspring. We use data from the Chinese
panel data set CHARLS, and employ family-time fixed effect to account for endogeneity
issues brought by unobservable family factors.
We find that the two transfer decisions that parents make, educational investment
and marital transfers, have a very different impact on the children’s location decision and
hence on their earnings potential. This leads to a different behavior of the children to
helping their parents later in life. In effect, these transfers have complementary effects
on children’s help: investments in education incentivize children to move away from
the parents to places with better employment opportunities. These children tend to
be financially well-off and support their parents with financial transfers in old age. On
the other hand, if parents provide marital transfers, such as a house, then children are
more likely to stay close to their parents. This, in turn, allows for more attention and
more potential long-term care from children. Investigating heterogeneous effects in the
population we find that these results tend to be present among both daughters and sons
whereas more representative among sons, and the positive impact of marital gifts on
living proximity is present even when rural-urban migration is controlled.
Future work could examine the reciprocity more precisely with comprehensive trans-
fer information. Other early life transfers, such as parents’ help with health shocks
and starting a business, are potentially correlated with marriage and education invest-
ments. McGarry (2016), for example, shows that the distribution of transfers across
siblings becomes more unequal for a longer observation period. Without considering
other transfers, the return of specific transfers might be overestimated (more unequal
distribution) or underestimated (equal distribution).
Although intergeneartional reciprocity seems to benefits both parents and children,
parents’ need for care potentially discourages children’s education and career enhance-
ments. Better education of children increases spatial dispersion of families by encour-
aging migration, which leaves behind parents who might become in need of care. Com-
pleting a long-term care system would not only improve living quality of the old, but
also help mitigating inequality by encouraging children from less developed regions to
migrate for better job opportunities, since it reduces parents’ need for informal care from
offspring and frees children from heavy care responsibility.
20The interaction terms between gender and marital gifts are statistically insignificant.
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A Sample Selection
It is an unbalanced panel with an original sample of 13,105 families with 38,897 children
and 66,192 child-year observations. Children across waves are first matched through
householdID and child ID. Children with inconsistent gender, and large differences in
age and educational attainment after the matching are further removed. We restrict
the sample to living biological children because adopted or fostered children could be
essentially different. Since marriage gifts questions are asked for the child’s first marriage,
we exclude children who were never married in all waves. Finally, we discard children
who co-resident with their parents as in these family arrangements intergenerational
transfers (time spend together, financial support) is hard to disentangle. Apart from
these selections, missing values of variables cause a further reduction in regression sample
sizes.
Table A1: Sample Selection
Selection Family Child OBS
original 13,105 38,897 66,192
wrongly matched -175 -2,453 -4,906
non living biological -2,691 -9,238 -10,121
age under 20 -167 -772 -1,843
never married -997 -3,169 -5,451
coresident -626 -2,734 -8,132
missing values -422 -1,893 -5,203
single child families -621 -621 -932
selected sample 7,406 18,017 29,604
26
B Results
Table B1: Old-age Support and Residential Choice: Family*time FE
Old-age support Residence choice
Visits Future help Transfer Ln amt transfer Same neighborhood Diff town
Money 0.853*** 0.012* -0.002 -0.122*** 0.065*** -0.092***
(2.96) (1.84) (-0.17) (-4.73) (5.59) (-8.56)
House 2.828*** 0.029** -0.004 -0.292*** 0.161*** -0.157***
(5.47) (2.49) (-0.24) (-6.75) (7.93) (-9.33)
Primary school 0.637 0.006 0.028** 0.092** 0.014 0.031*
(1.44) (0.67) (1.98) (2.26) (0.76) (1.94)
Secondary school -0.041 0.011 0.058*** 0.200*** -0.031 0.068***
(-0.08) (1.02) (3.73) (4.52) (-1.53) (3.73)
High school -1.186** 0.011 0.095*** 0.368*** -0.084*** 0.101***
(-2.07) (0.95) (5.53) (7.40) (-3.68) (4.84)
College unfinanced -4.375*** -0.026 0.150*** 0.635*** -0.227*** 0.212***
(-5.96) (-1.62) (6.34) (9.27) (-7.57) (6.67)
College financed -3.959*** -0.027* 0.160*** 0.798*** -0.214*** 0.274***
(-5.93) (-1.77) (7.56) (12.79) (-8.23) (10.01)
Son 4.326*** 0.079*** -0.105*** 0.179*** 0.245*** 0.058***
(17.51) (12.95) (-14.46) (7.62) (25.62) (6.87)
Age 0.050 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.014***
(0.46) (0.09) (0.92) (0.12) (1.21) (-3.31)
Agesqr -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000**
(-0.24) (-0.89) (-1.52) (-1.32) (-0.54) (2.19)
Only son/dau -1.175*** 0.008 -0.004 0.154*** -0.076*** 0.026**
(-3.85) (0.99) (-0.45) (4.84) (-6.13) (2.26)
Birth order -0.154 -0.004 -0.008* -0.000 -0.010* -0.001
(-0.99) (-1.13) (-1.72) (-0.00) (-1.72) (-0.11)
Marital status 0.483 0.012 0.058*** -0.033 0.011 -0.087***
(1.20) (1.11) (3.81) (-0.73) (0.70) (-5.43)
Observations 29,604 29,604 29,604 21,905 29,604 29,604
R-squared 0.067 0.034 0.029 0.062 0.133 0.042
Robust t-statistics in parentheses






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B3: Parental transfers and living proximity by gender
Same neighborhood Diff town
Dau Son Dau Son
Marital gift 0.0646*** 0.0799*** -0.104*** -0.0938***
(4.753) (5.105) (-8.215) (-6.302)
Primary school 0.00974 -0.135*** 0.0145 0.111***
(0.479) (-3.701) (0.831) (4.116)
Secondary school 0.000354 -0.230*** 0.0499** 0.145***
(0.0163) (-6.073) (2.501) (5.036)
High school -0.00668 -0.318*** 0.117*** 0.151***
(-0.264) (-8.022) (4.808) (4.855)
College unfinanced -0.0503 -0.528*** 0.212*** 0.283***
(-1.454) (-11.68) (5.324) (6.368)
College financed -0.0229 -0.524*** 0.263*** 0.354***
(-0.798) (-12.92) (7.921) (9.407)
Observations 29,604 29,604 29,604 29,604
z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B2: By gender: education and old-age support
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